16 Responses to “Universally Preferable Behaviour – A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics”

1. Kevin K on April 14th, 2010 4:57 pm

   “8. Universally Preferable Behavior: When somebody says that all people at all times and at all places should prefer one thing over another, then he is making a statement about universally preferable behavior (UPB). Arguing against the existence of UPB implies, from the viewpoint of the person making the argument, that all people at all times and at all places should prefer the idea that UPB doesn’t exist. Arguing against UPB implicitly accepts its existence. Thus it is impossible to refute the existence of UPB.”

   I don’t see how refuting UPB requires universal acknowledgement of its non-existence. It is quite common for people to accept non-reality as fact – look at any religion. Human preference is not perfectly rational, so it is reasonable to suppose that somebody, somewhere may prefer to believe UPB exists even if it doesn’t, meaning its refusal does not require universal preference.

   This is not to say that UPB cannot exist, just that the above proof is not logically sound.

2. Nima on April 14th, 2010 6:04 pm

   @Kevin K

   Thanks much for your feedback.

   Let me make sure I understand your point right.

   Your first point is: Arguing that UPB doesn’t exist does not mean that the person uttering the statement implies that everyone SHOULD believe that UPB doesn’t exist?

   I would need an example of how that would work.

   On the next point: I am not saying that human preference is necessarily perfectly rational.

   This one I don’t understand at all: “somebody, somewhere may prefer to believe UPB exists even if it doesn’t, meaning its refusal does not require universal preference.”

   I didn’t really say that its refusal requires universal preference. You seem to be referring to personal preference here, right? So you are saying somebody somewhere might personally prefer to believe that UPB exists or doesn’t exist? Absolutely! But that is not arguing about the truth of the statement “UPB exists”. It would rather be a personal preference, such as “I prefer to eat chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream”. Clearly personal preferences do exist, but they fall in the category “other” which is not the scope of the topic at hand.

   Here is what I am saying:

   Anyone who argues and tries to convince me that UPB does not exist, necessarily implies that, from his own point of view, everybody else SHOULD believe that UPB does not exist, rather than that is does exist. Otherwise what he’d be doing would not be arguing the validity and/or accuracy of UPB. This does not mean by any means that everyone else WILL believe that UPB does not exist, only that the person arguing thinks that it is preferable that everyone else believe that his theory is true.

3. Danny on April 15th, 2010 12:01 pm

   Thanks for the heads up about your review, Nima. I see that you posted your comment on one of my earlier commentaries on the book, so I wonder if you have seen my more thorough critique of the book here: http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2009/04/critique-of-stefan-molyneuxs-ethical.html

   In my critique, I think I offer some reasons for going back on some of the things you’ve said here, but I leave it to you to draw your own conclusions. Thanks again for getting in touch, and please feel free to let me know if you think my analysis is off-target.

4. Kevin K on April 15th, 2010 2:10 pm

   OK, I think I understand it a little better now. You are saying that to argue that UPB doesn’t exist, I must prefer everyone to believe that it doesn’t exist. Assuming that I prefer everyone to be rational (which I do), then this makes sense. But UPB was defined in (8) as a statement that everyone ought to hold a certain preference, which is different from a personal preference that everyone hold a statement to be true.

   In other words, “everyone should prefer =/= everyone should believe”. At least, I don’t see how they could be the same.

   It is also possible we aren’t thinking of the same thing when we talk about ‘preference’. In (6) you define it as a measure of desire for some action relative to other possible actions. I would instead define preference as a measure of desire for some condition relative to other possible conditions. For example, I prefer having more money over having less money. To say you prefer an action, means you prefer the condition resulting from that action to the condition if nothing happens, or if another action is taken instead. I prefer working, because I expect I will end up with more money than if I don’t. I prefer running over sleeping in the morning, because since at that time the I desire the expected fitness from running much more than the expected energy from additional sleep. I’m not sure if this is really relevant to the discussion, but I decided to bring it up anyways.

5. Nima on April 15th, 2010 4:11 pm

   @Kevin K

   Exellent points that you are bringing up. Just a few comments:

   everyone should prefer =/= everyone should believe

   I would disagree here. Believing something is in itself a preference over believing everything else. I would rather say that “everyone should believe x” is tantamount to “everyone should prefer to believe x over y,z,…”

   I don’t think you would need to prefer everyone to be rational. All I am saying that if the proposition you are making is that “X does not exist” is a true statement, then you are by necessity implying that everyone should rather prefer to believe “X does not exist” over “X does exist”, otherwise your arguing would be completely meaningless, and would actually not be arguing. Even if somebody is from your viewpoint irrational, you would still be implying that it would be preferable for him to be rational and support your thesis.

   I would instead define preference as a measure of desire for some condition relative to other possible conditions.

   I agree here. My definition above is a subset of the one you are proposing. I am applying the overall concept of value preference to the particular instance of action, since my main point here is to relate preference to behavior.

   I fully agree that your definition is more encompassing and accurate, but it doesn’t change the nature of UPB.

6. Jesse on April 18th, 2010 3:45 pm

   I love this summary. Very well done!

   To me it seems clear that to argue against universal ethics is a contradiction because one would be implicitly saying \one OUGHT not believe X\, thus creating a preferable state of human behavior.

7. Luke on April 20th, 2010 9:28 am

   Great review! UPB blew my mind a few years ago and I’ve been steadily recovering ever since. It’s basically only gone and solved the entire problem of ethics, in one foul/beautiful/mind-bending swoop!!! :)

   You have an excellent, clear writing style. I think you’ll probably find many people get ’stuck at’ or disagree with point #8 in your review. Quote: ‘Arguing against the existence of UPB implies, from the viewpoint of the person making the argument, that all people at all times and at all places should prefer the idea that UPB doesn’t exist.’

   The nihilists/relativists dislike this juicy factoid. They’ll protest something like, “but it’s only my personal *preference* when I argue/disagree, no ethics implied!” or “well you’re wrong, but that doesn’t mean you *ought* to change your mind!” etc; which is all kinds of dishonest of course, but also sadly logically flawed. UPB shreds this relativism/nihilism to bits.

   Anyway, fantastic summary! Hurrah!

8. Nima on April 20th, 2010 10:41 am

   @Luke
   Luke, thanks so much for your feedback, I really appreciate it.

   Yes, I agree absolutely. Many people will object to #8, because I did myself initially.

   But I realized that the only tricks one could pull in order to “refute” it would be semantic and dishonest wordplays.

9. Will Moyer on April 20th, 2010 12:49 pm

   Great and concise summary. I totally bookmarked this for future reference, whenever I need a UPB refresher.

   I think you are right about UPB the book being a little hard to follow. It wasn’t until Stef made some videos about it, like “Ethics Reloaded” that it really started to click for me.

   One thing I definitely didn’t get the from just reading the book was that UPB evaluates theories not actions.

   But UPB — although simple once you get it — is a hard and complex thing to initially wrap your head around, so I don’t think it’s entirely Stef’s fault. I think a lot of the confusing “inconsistencies” or metaphors arose because he spent so much time addressing and explaining concerns and trying to create a lot of different ways to approach the theory. (Like the five different proofs for UPB section.)

   I think a call between you and him about the book would be fantastic.

10. Cody Dodd on June 18th, 2010 1:18 pm

    Great article! Conciseness is what the UPB book needs :). Thanks for this.

    I’d be interested in seeing your summary of Real-Time Relationships by Stef. Not sure if that is your area of interest though.

11. alex on October 6th, 2010 3:46 pm

    With you concise summary I don’t come to the conclusion “It is universally preferable NOT to rape.” . Since it only proves that it is not universally preferable to rape. That does not exclude the possibility that rape is not subject to universal preferences. For example it is my preference to eat my pie. But it cannot be universally preferable to eat my pie, since there is only one. Jet is is not immoral to eat my pie, since I am eating it and that is fine.

12. Nima on October 7th, 2010 12:08 am

    Alex, thanks for the feedback.

    Let me give you my take on it:

    Eating your pie doesn’t fall under the category of morality in the first place for two reasons:

    1. “Your pie” takes the statement out of the realm of universality. Clearly your pie is of limited size. Thus any statement you make about preferable behavior involving your pie is outside of universality.

    2. Whether you eat or don’t eat your pie, none of the two options would have to be avoided via the use of violence or considerable effort. It would simply suffice for you to put it in your mouth or to refrain from doing so, respectively.

    Thus, while it’s not universally preferable, that doesn’t immediately make it immoral.

    In the case of rape it’s very different. Just take the following statement through that same grinder:

    “Everyone, at all times and at all places should rather NOT rape than rape others.”

    1. Is it a universal statement? Yes, because it proposes a general rule about preferable behavior that is binding on all people at all times and at all places.

    2. Does it fall in the realm of morality? Yes, because the option of raping, if the victim tried to avoid it from happening, would have to be avoided via the use of violence or at least considerable effort.

    Only then would you test #3, meaning it’s logical consistency. In this case there arise no logical inconsistencies with saying that all people should refrain from raping.

    In that sense, and only in that sense, can we conclude that rape is immoral.

13. Human Action, Ethics, Praxeology, Economics, and History on October 29th, 2010 1:34 pm

    [...] particular I borrowed from Stefan Molyneux’ Universally Preferable Behavior and from Mises’ Human Action. The flowchart below is the [...]

14. Nima on December 17th, 2010 12:22 pm

    Here’s another video I posted, responding to a critique of UPB:

15. Noesis on December 31st, 2011 8:36 pm

    I have posted a critique of this summary (and UPB by extension, of course) here:

    http://board.freedomainradio.com/forums/p/29310/260599.aspx#260599

16. Morality and the non-aggression principle « The Rule of Freedom on February 12th, 2012 10:10 am

    [...] does one define morality? Do we all have different morals? Is there universally-preferable behaviour, or is all moralising just opinion? These are difficult questions, and will likely be debated for [...]

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